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Gelecek Vizyonlar Dergisi 2026, Clt. 10(1) 50-58
Market Definition as an Instrument in European Union Competition Law
ss. 50 - 58
Yayın Tarihi: Haziran 30, 2026 | Görüntüleme Sayısı: 0/0 | İndirilme Sayısı: 0/0
Özet
Market definition has long occupied a central position in EU competition law as the primary analytical framework for assessing market power and competitive constraints. By delineating the boundaries within which firms operate, it provides a structured basis for evaluating dominance and anti-competitive conduct. However, the increasing prevalence of multi-sided platforms and digital business models has exposed significant limitations in the traditional application of market definition. In particular, the growing importance of zero-price services, indirect network effects, and non-price dimensions of competition challenges the reliance on price-based tools such as the SSNIP test and the assumption of clearly defined market boundaries. This article argues that while market definition remains an indispensable component of EU competition law, its role should be reconsidered in light of contemporary market realities. Rather than treating market definition as a rigid and determinative step, it should be understood as an instrumental and context-dependent analytical tool. Building on an examination of the conceptual foundations and evidentiary framework of market definition, the article highlights its inherent limitations, including its sensitivity to interpretative choices, its dependence on imperfect data, and its difficulty in capturing dynamic and interdependent market relationships. The analysis further demonstrates that these limitations become particularly pronounced in digital and multi-sided markets, where competitive interactions are shaped by complex ecosystem effects and innovation-driven competition. In response, the article advocates for a more flexible and effects-based approach that places greater emphasis on the direct assessment of competitive constraints and market dynamics. Such an approach does not abandon market definition, but rather situates it within a broader analytical framework, ensuring that it supports, rather than determines, the outcome of competition law analysis. In this way, the article contributes to ongoing debates on the evolution of EU competition law in the digital economy.
Anahtar kelimeler: Market definition, EU competition law, Digital markets, Multi-sided platforms, Effects-based analysis
APA 7th edition
Pehlivanli, A.S. (2026). Market Definition as an Instrument in European Union Competition Law. Gelecek Vizyonlar Dergisi, 10(1), 50-58.
Harvard
Pehlivanli, A. (2026). Market Definition as an Instrument in European Union Competition Law. Gelecek Vizyonlar Dergisi, 10(1), pp. 50-58.
Chicago 16th edition
Pehlivanli, Ahmed Saim (2026). "Market Definition as an Instrument in European Union Competition Law". Gelecek Vizyonlar Dergisi 10 (1):50-58.
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